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I. INTRODUCTION
In a common business arrangement, an American software company
designs software in the United States, then sends the software code abroad
where copies are mass-produced and distributed. Prior to the Federal Circuit’s
ruling in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the American
company could have been found liable for patent infringement under Section
271(f) of the Patent Act if the software mass-produced abroad infringed a
United States patent.  Cardiac Pacemakers, however, leaves United States1
patent owners defenseless when the allegedly infringed patent claims are
method claims. The background of Cardiac Pacemakers, the Court’s
rationales, and the implications of the decision are the subject of this Note.
A. A Global Economy v. National Patent Systems
The goods and services of today’s global economy often travel through
several continents before reaching their final destination.  Components of a2
product may originate from all corners of the world; the product may be
assembled in a different location; and the final product may be sold in yet
another location only to be shipped anywhere in the world. Despite the
increasingly global development of markets around the world, patent
protection—the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
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3. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a), 271(a) (2008).
4. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2123 (2008) (stating that “intellectual property rights . . . are still national in nature: a patent,
copyright, or trademark only affords the owner the right to exclude within a given country’s borders”);
Norris, supra note 2, at 351 (asserting that “[t]raditionally, under United States law, patents have been
given only territorial application”).
5. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2123. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498, 1502 (2001) (stating “[p]rosecuting patents is expensive. There is some
disagreement on precisely how expensive it is, but the general range of costs for prosecuting a patent from
start to finish (including application and various filing fees paid to the PTO, and attorney’s fees not only
to prepare and file the application, but to respond to office actions and continue prosecution through to
issuance or abandonment) appears to be $10,000 to $30,000 per patent.” And further stating in regards to
patent litigation “[w]hen patent litigation does occur, it is expensive. The American Intellectual Property
Law Association reports, based on a survey of its members, that the median cost of patent litigation to each
side is $790,000 through the end of discovery, and $1,503,000 through trial and appeal” (citing AIPLA
Report of Economic Survey (of U.S. IP Practitioners) (1999))).
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
7. See Donald S. Chisum, Comment, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual
Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 605–06 (1997).
8. Id. at 616.
selling, or importing a new, useful, and non-obvious invention —is granted3
by individual countries and is generally only enforced within the territory of
each granting country.  In other words, patent laws are territorial rather than4
extraterritorial. Consequently, patent owners must operate within many
different territorial patent systems to protect their inventions.
The territorial limit of a patent results in large expenses for patent owners
who must “anticipate the varying levels of protection and attempt to maximize
their opportunities on a country-by-country basis” by prosecuting patent
applications in multiple patent systems and potentially litigating parallel
patents in multiple jurisdictions.  International agreements, such as the5
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(hereinafter “TRIPS”), have begun to harmonize patent laws between member
states by setting minimum levels of protection.  Despite the harmonization6
achieved by TRIPS, patent owners are still required to prosecute patent
applications and to litigate patents in individual countries at high costs.  A7
leading patent scholar predicted over a decade ago that these “[t]wo
developments—the increasing interdependence of the global economy and the
growing concern over the cost of multinational intellectual property rights
procurement and enforcement—will make territorialism an unacceptable
obstacle to international trade.”8
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9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2008):
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or
a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any
component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the
invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so
made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States
in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2008) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
as an infringer.”); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2008).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
12. 35 U.S.C.§ 271(c) (2008) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or
a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable
as a contributory infringer.”).
B. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)’s Extraterritorial Reach
There are limited exceptions to the territorial limit of patent laws.
Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) provides that a patent may be infringed when
a component or components of the patented invention are supplied from the
United States and shipped abroad for assembly.  The first subpart of Section9
271(f) mirrors the inducing infringement provision of Section 271(b) requiring
the supply of a substantial portion of components from the United States and
the inducement of the combination of the components outside the United
States into the patented invention.  The second subpart of Section 271(f)10
applies when a component especially made for the patented invention and not
a staple article is supplied from the United States knowing and intending that
the component will be combined outside the United States to form the
patented invention.  This subpart mirrors Section 271(c), the contributory11
infringement provision.12
C. Confusion in the Courts: Varied Approaches to Applying 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)
The Supreme Court has followed a strict territorial rule and has not
extended United States patent law extraterritorially without a clear signal from
120 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:117
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1856); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437, 440 (2007); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
14. See Kendra Robins, Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational Patent Litigation:
Proposed Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (2007) (asserting “[a]lthough the text of
Section[] 271(f) . . . seemingly limits these statutes’ extraterritorial reach by requiring some nexus between
the foreign conduct and the conduct occurring in the United States, recent cases illustrate that the Federal
Circuit has been willing to stretch the text of these statutes in order to find such a connection.”).
15. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2127.
16. Id.
17. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2119–20; see Norris, supra note 2, at 352.
18. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2155.
19. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
20. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
21. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2127.
Congress.  However, some courts have broadly construed United States13
patent law to protect United States patent owners even when Congress has not
explicitly rebutted the presumption of territoriality.  According to one14
scholar, “recent cases show that Congress is not acting expediently in closing
new perceived loopholes that are arising in [patent] protection.”  As a result,15
some courts “have been willing to step up and extend the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. patents in ways that are shockingly different from the reticence
expressed in the past.”16
Courts stretch the limits of the territoriality principle under the so-called
effects-based test, which “permit[s] the patent to cover acts occurring outside
the United States” when there is “any effect on the U.S. market.”  A court17
may look for an economic effect on the United States market or an aspect of
the technology that is within the United States.  In extending the18
extraterritorial effect of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), the Federal Circuit held at one
time that “every form of invention eligible for patenting falls within the
protection of section 271(f),” including method claims for software.  The19
most recent cases, however, from both the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have limited the extraterritorial extension of Section 271(f).20
The varied approaches by the courts—either applying a strict territorial
rule to limit the application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) or applying an effects-based
test to expand the extraterritorial application of the statute—have confused the
current state of the law. According to one scholar, “the current state of the law
is unclear and lacks a firm theoretical foundation. The courts have failed to
articulate a persuasive jurisprudence for assessing the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. patent rights.”  As a result of the confusion, patent owners are less able21
to value their patents and determine the strength of their position when
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22. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
23. Id.
confronted with or asserting infringement allegations. In the midst of this
problematic confusion, Cardiac Pacemakers arrived in the Federal Circuit.
D. The Cardiac Pacemakers Decision
The Federal Circuit’s Cardiac Pacemakers opinion jolted the fluctuating
state of the law by limiting the extraterritorial effect of Section 271(f) for a
category of patent claims—method claims.  Holding, en banc, that Section22
271(f) does not apply to method claims, the Federal Circuit’s decision
explicitly overruled its own precedent.  Conceivably, the Cardiac23
Pacemakers decision will result in a more consistent application of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) for future cases. However, the decision has important implications for
the international community, United States industry, and owners of United
States method patents. The Federal Circuit’s limitation on Section 271(f)
likely necessitated a legislative amendment to Section 271 of the Patent Act
in order to protect method patents.
This note provides a thorough analysis of the Cardiac Pacemakers
decision. Part II discusses the historical and legal background leading up to the
Federal Circuit granting en banc rehearing on the case. The procedural history
of the Cardiac Pacemakers case, the en banc majority’s reasoning for
overturning its own prior ruling, and Judge Newman’s lone dissent are laid out
in Part III. Finally, Part IV discusses the policy implications of Cardiac
Pacemakers to the international community, United States industry and
owners of United States method patents. Furthermore, Part IV argues that a
legislative amendment is necessary to protect United States method patents in
situations paralleling the newly created loophole of Cardiac Pacemakers.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF CARDIAC PACEMAKERS
While the critical statutory language interpreted in Cardiac Pacemakers
was not enacted until 1984, a thorough analysis of the decision begins with a
discussion of territoriality in United States patent law.
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24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (9th ed. 2009).
25. Id. (quoting PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE
64 (2001)).
26. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
27. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
28. William Greubel, Note, A Comedy of Errors: Defining “Component” in a Global Information
Technology Market—Accounting for Innovation by Penalizing the Innovators, 24 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 507, 512 (2006) (citing Curtis A. Bradley, Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Intellectual Property Law: Principal Paper: Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L LAW 505, 513–14 (1997)) (stating that although no definite account exists, a
review of the Supreme Court’s extraterritorial decisions reveals that over time these five justifications have
been articulated).
29. See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 216; Dariush Keyhani, Patent Law in the Global Economy: A
Modest Proposal for U.S. Patent Law and Infringement without Borders, 54 VILL. L. REV. 291, 292 (2009)
(“Creating liability under U.S. law for activities that do not violate the domestic laws of the places where
the activity occurs is contrary to basic presumptions of all major international treatises on intellectual
property law and principles of comity.”).
30. Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition Respondents,
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1615) (“The reissued panel
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Territoriality is “[t]he principle that a nation has the right of sovereignty
within its borders.”  According to Professor Goldstein, three maxims are24
incorporated into the principle of territoriality: (1) a state’s laws should only
have force within that state’s borders, (2) anyone within the state’s boundaries
is subject to the laws of that state, and (3) comity should “discipline sovereign
exercises of authority so that the territorial effect of each state’s laws is
respected.”  As stated by the United States Supreme Court, the “legislation25
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial boundaries of the United States.”  In other words, there is a26
presumption of territoriality, which can only be overcome when “the
affirmative intention of Congress [is] clearly expressed.”27
Throughout analyses pertaining to the territoriality principle, the Supreme
Court has justified the presumption of territoriality on five different grounds:
international law, international comity, choice of law principles, congressional
intent, and separation of powers considerations.  Generally, applying United28
States patent law extraterritorially is negatively perceived because it fails to
consider the policies and sovereignty of foreign countries.  For example,29
when the Federal Circuit in NTP v. Research in Motion failed to consider the
interests of Canada regarding alleged acts of infringement within Canada, the
Canadian government expressed frustration with the American court for the
unilateral assertion of United States patent law abroad.  Despite the30
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opinion lacks any acknowledgment or discussion of the effect of, or the effect upon, long-established
international understandings and agreements regarding national jurisdiction over intellectual property. . . .
Explicit articulation of such principles will not merely facilitate the evolution of international intellectual
property law, nor simply satisfy the Supreme Court’s admonition . . . to address such matters in statutory
construction analyses when potential issues of extraterritoriality are implicated, but also avoid what
otherwise could appear to some as a unilateral assertion of patent infringement jurisdiction, justified solely
in terms of national law, over the technology of a trans-national system.”).
31. For example, the United States patent system includes “higher-order living animals, computer
software, and business methods” as patentable subject matter, though many other countries do not protect
this subject matter. Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2164.
32. Scholars have proposed alternative solutions to protecting the United States patent owner
without extraterritorially extending United States law. For example, Timothy Holbrook suggests that courts
should “explicitly consider foreign law in assessing whether to enforce a patent extraterritorially” so that
an alleged infringer would not be held liable under United States patent law unless he “would also infringe
under the laws of the foreign country.” Holbrook, supra note 4, at 2120. Kendra Robins suggests that “U.S.
courts should look to the adjudication of parallel foreign patents in addition to the U.S. patent in suit.”
Robins argues that “[i]n many situations, the adjudication of foreign patents serves as a practical alternative
that can alleviate some of the policy concerns arising from the courts’ recent constructions of Section 271(f)
and (g).” Robins, supra note 14, at 1266.
33. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531–32 (1972), discussed infra at
note 50.
substantial harmonization of patent laws throughout the world as a result of
the TRIPS agreement, differences between patent systems remain, and the
extraterritorial extension of United States patent law disregards these
differences.  Consequently, such extraterritorial application of United States31
patent law is ill-perceived by the international patent community.
Though the extension of United States patent laws extraterritorially may
be problematic to international laws, international comity, choice of laws,
congressional intent, and separation of powers, the failure to extend United
States patent laws extraterritorially can hurt United States patent owners.  For32
example, prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), a company could avoid
infringement liability by manufacturing all the components of a patented
invention in the United States and then shipping the components overseas for
final assembly.  This loophole in the enforcement of patents left patent33
owners in a defenseless position. The new loophole created by Cardiac
Pacemakers leaves method patent owners vulnerable to competitors who may
manufacture physical components in the United States, which may be used to
practice a patented method, and then induce use of the patented method
outside the United States.
Congressional decisions to extend United States patent law
extraterritorially, such as 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), must balance countervailing
concerns: the justifications for the presumption against territoriality and the
needs of the United States patent system, including effects on United States
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34. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188.
38. Id. at 195–96.
industry and United States method patent owners. The Federal Circuit’s
decision to limit application of Section 271(f) to non-method patents should
invite Congress to reconsider these countervailing concerns for method
patents. Upon reconsideration, it should be apparent that a legislative
amendment to Section 271 is necessary which clearly rebuts the presumption
against extraterritoriality and extends United States patent law for method
patents under a provision similar to Section 271(f). Without such an
amendment, method patents will remain devalued and, consequently, there
will be little incentive for inventors to obtain them.
B. Brown v. Duchesne: An Early Statement on the Territoriality of United
States Patent Law
Under the territoriality principle, the patent laws of the United States are
presumed only to apply within the boundaries of the United States.  This has34
long been a foundational principle of United States patent law.  Brown v.35
Duchesne is the first reported case commenting on the territoriality of United
States patent laws.  In Brown v. Duchesne, the Supreme Court failed to find36
patent infringement although a French schooner with an allegedly patent
infringing sail was docked in a Boston harbor under the “temporary presence
doctrine.”  The Court continued in dicta with the often-cited statement on the37
territoriality of United States patent laws:
[T]hese acts of Congress [the Patent Statutes] do not, and were not intended to, operate
beyond the limits of the United States; and as the patentee’s right of property and
exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which the
law itself is confined. And the use of it outside of the jurisdiction of the United States is
not an infringement of his rights, and he has no claim to any compensation for the profit
or advantage the party may derive from it.38
In other words, the principle of territoriality restricts the United States from
imposing United States patent laws outside the jurisdiction of the United
States.
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39. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
40. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 394 (3d ed. 2009) (“§ 271(f) involves certain extraterritorial
activities, but those activities must have a nexus to acts occurring in the United States. Where that nexus
is adequately established, § 271(f) creates liability as an exception to the ‘general rule under United States
patent law that no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and sold in another country.’”
(quoting AT&T II, 441 U.S. at 441)) (emphasis added).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), (2) (2008).
42. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
43. Id. at 524.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 526.
47. Id. at 531.
C. The Deepsouth Loophole and Enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)
Due to the territoriality of United States patent laws, a United States
patent is generally only infringed when the infringing activity occurs in the
United States.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f), however, is an exception to that general39
rule.  Consequently, prior to the enactment of Section 271(f), manufacturers40
in the United States were able to easily avoid infringement liability for
another’s patent when manufacturing (1) “a substantial portion of the
components of the patented invention” and inducing infringement of the
patent outside the United States or (2) when manufacturing a non-staple
component “especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention .
. . knowing” and “intending” infringement of the patent outside the United
States.  The manufacturer must simply have shipped the component or41
components overseas for final assembly to circumvent liability.
The scenario prohibited by 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) was explicitly allowed
by the United States Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.  In Deepsouth, components of a patented shrimp-deveining machine42
were manufactured in the United States and shipped overseas for assembly.43
The components were shipped in three separate boxes and could be assembled
into the patented machine in less than an hour.  Because the patented product44
was not made within the United States, the company expertly discovered a
loophole in United States patent law and easily circumvented it.  Specifically,45
without a finding of direct infringement within the United States, the
Deepsouth Court could not find contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c).  The court relied on the territoriality principle it enunciated in46
Brown v. Duchense to conclude that a “clear and certain signal from
Congress” was necessary before the patentee could assert rights in this
situation.47
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48. 130 CONG. REC. H10525 (1984).
49. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284.
50. Robins, supra note 14, at 1277 (“[I]t is ambiguous whether Congress, in enacting Section 271(f)
intended to merely overturn Deepsouth or whether Congress intended 271(f) to have broader extraterritorial
effect.”) (citing Joan E. Beckner, Patent Infringement by Component Export: Waymark Corp. v. Porta
Systems Corp. and the Extraterritorial Effect of U.S. Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 803 (2002)); Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 n.18 (2007) (“Section 271(f)’s text does, in one respect, reach past the
facts of Deepsouth. While Deepsouth exported kits containing all the parts of its deveining machines,
§ 271(f)(1) applies to supply abroad of ‘all or a substantial portion’ of the patented invention’s components.
And § 271(f)(2) applies to the export of even a single component if it is ‘especially made or especially
adopted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use.’”).
51. See generally James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives under the Patent Laws:
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215 (2006).
52. For example, an early case interpreting “component” was brought before the District Court of
the Eastern District of Virginia in 1998. Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998).
In Enpat, the district court determined that Microsoft’s foreign sales of its Microsoft Project and Microsoft
Team Manager products did not infringe a patented method for a project manager system. Id. at 539. In
reaching this conclusion, the district court examined the legislative history of the statute finding an
“exclusive focus on the sale of components patented in the United States for combination into a finished
product, apparatus, or invention abroad;” thus, the court held that § 271(f) did not apply to method patents.
Id.
The following year, the District Court of Delaware reached the opposite conclusion in W.R. Grace &
Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., an infringement case involving a patented chemical composition. 60 F. Supp.
2d 316 (D. Del. 1999). Though the opinion did not explicitly address application of Section 271(f) to
method patents, the court adopted a broad interpretation of “component” in applying the statute to chemical
compositions noting that “[n]owhere in the statute or its legislative history is there a limitation to
components of machines and other structure combinations.” Id. at 321.
Over ten years after the Court’s invitation to Congress to resolve the
Deepsouth loophole, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) was enacted, which legislatively
overruled the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion in Deepsouth.48
Section 271(f) demonstrates a clear Congressional intent to legislate
extraterritorially.  Much of the recent discussion by courts and legal scholars49
focuses on whether Congress intended Section 271(f) to merely overturn the
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth or to have a broader
extraterritorial effect.  While application of the statute is relatively50
straightforward for product claims in the manufacturing and physical
technologies, such as in Deepsouth, application of the statute in other contexts
has been problematic.51
D. Federal Circuit Cases Leading up to Cardiac Pacemakers
In early cases applying 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), district courts failed to
consistently interpret “component” within the statute.  The inconsistent52
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In 2002, the District Court of New Jersey relied on the Enpat court’s reasoning and asserted as a
matter of law “that § 271(f) does not apply to method patents.” Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs,
Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002). The method patents in this case were directed to assays that
“determine whether certain chemical compounds will bind with certain proteins residing on the surface of
human cell,” which are useful to pharmaceutical companies in developing new drugs. Id. at 455. These
conflicting interpretations of “component” by the district courts demonstrate the early inconsistency in
applying the statute outside the traditional sphere of product claims in manufacturing and physical
technologies.
53. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
57. Id.
58. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
59. AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1369.
60. Id. at 1370.
61. Id. at 1368.
application of Section 271(f) by district courts encouraged the Federal Circuit
to clarify the issue. In decisions leading up to Cardiac Pacemakers, the
Federal Circuit had consistently construed “component” in Section 271(f) with
increasing breadth and applied the infringement provision to a wide-variety
of technologies. For example, in Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
Microsoft provided golden master discs with software code to foreign
manufactures.  The court first asserted, “every component of every form of53
invention deserves the protection of 271(f).”  Because “[e]xact duplicates of54
the software code on the golden master disk are incorporated as an operating
element of the ultimate device,” Microsoft had provided a “component” under
the statute and was liable as an infringer.55
In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. (AT&T I), a case involving facts
similar to those in Eolas, Microsoft again supplied golden master disks to
foreign manufacturers.  As in Eolas, the Federal Circuit found Microsoft56
liable as an infringer under Section 271(f).  Though the Supreme Court later57
reversed this holding,  the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is interesting. The58
court first relied on Eolas to assert that the golden master disks with Windows
software—though sent abroad electronically—were “component[s] of a
patented invention.”  The court then held that the disks were “supplied” from59
the United States within the meaning of the statute.  Though Microsoft sent60
limited disks abroad, the recipients were authorized by Microsoft to copy the
software and to install it on foreign-assembled computers.  “Accordingly, for61
software ‘components,’ the court found that the act of copying is subsumed
in the act of ‘supplying,’ such that sending a single copy abroad with the
128 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 29:117
62. Id. at 1370.
63. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastic Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
64. Id. at 1370.
65. Id. at 1369.
66. Id. at 1381.
67. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1379 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
68. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
69. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1379.
70. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1379 (citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
71. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 440 (2007).
72. Id. at 449 n.10.
intent that it be replicated invoked § 271(f) liability for those foreign-made
copies.”62
Finally, the Federal Circuit’s holding in Union Carbide Chemicals &
Plastic Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. reaffirmed the Eolas court’s
assertion that “every form of invention” is protected by 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).63
In Union Carbide, the contested patent claimed an improved method to
produce ethylene oxide.  The district court held that Section 271(f) did not64
apply to method claims.  On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held that65
the district court had erred in this finding and remanded the case.  The court66
reasoned that patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.”  First, the court found that a process claim, also called67
a method claim, “consists of a series of acts or steps.”  The court then68
reiterated the statement from an earlier case that “the statute makes no
distinction between patentable method/process inventions and other forms of
patentable inventions.”  Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that69
Section 271(f) applies to all patentable subject matter and the phrase
“component(s) of a patented invention” in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) includes
components of method patents—the series of steps to practice the method.70
E. The Supreme Court’s Effort to Resolve the Confusion
The United States Supreme Court has also expressed an opinion
concerning the proper interpretation of “component” in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).71
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. (AT&T II), the Court reversed a Federal
Circuit decision and drew a narrow distinction between the facts in Eolas and
AT&T I.  Because the foreign manufacturers made a copy of the golden72
master disk before installing the software into the computers, the Court
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73. Id. at 453.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 454–55.
76. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med. Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1364–65.
79. In the initial action before the district court, the jury found that St. Jude Medical infringed
Cardiac Pacemakers’ patent and awarded Cardiac Pacemaker $140 million in royalties. Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. IP 96-1718-CH/K (S.D. Ind. 2002). However, the District Court
overturned this verdict, granted a new trial, and granted judgment as a matter of law on invalidity and
noninfringement to St. Jude. Id.
Cardiac Pacemaker appealed the district court’s judgment, and the Federal Circuit affirmed in part
and modified in part the district court’s claim construction, reinstated the jury verdict on validity, and
remanded for a new trial on the issues of infringement and damages. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). St. Jude’s motions for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and
certiorari were denied. Id., St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 544 U.S. 1032 (2005).
On remand, the court’s “Damages Decision” limited damages to ICDs that “executed the claimed
method of cardioversion during the relevant infringement period,” but did not limit damages to ICD’s sold
in the United States because those sold abroad could infringe the claimed method under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The district court
then permitted damages and granted Cardiac Pacemakers’ motion for Summary Judgment of Infringement,
considered the copy—not the golden master disk—to be the “component”
within the meaning of statute.  Microsoft provided the “golden master” disk,73
but not the copy so Microsoft escaped infringement liability.  The Supreme74
Court concluded by affirming the presumption against extraterritoriality:
“United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world” and this
presumption “applies with particular force in patent law.”75
III. THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS DECISION
A. The Background of the Cardiac Pacemakers Decision
In Cardiac Pacemakers, the challenged claim was directed to a method
of treating abnormal heart rhythms by determining the heart condition,
selecting cardioversion as the appropriate therapy, and executing a
cardioverting shock with an implantable cardiovascular defibrillator (ICD).76
Cardiac Pacemaker alleged that a competitor produced ICDs in the United
States that were capable of performing the patented method and exported
these ICDs abroad.  Cardiac Pacemaker argued that the ICDs were77
components of the patented method claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and, thus,
that the exportation of these “components” violated Section 271(f).78
Cardiac Pacemakers followed a circuitous route to the Federal Circuit’s
en banc opinion.  Upon reaching the en banc Federal Circuit, the court79
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but also granted St. Jude’s motion for Summary Judgment for anticipation. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Med., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D. Ind. 2007). The parties cross-appealed. Id.
The Federal Circuit on appeal affirmed the district’s court limitation on damages to ICDs sold abroad
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), reversed the district court’s summary judgment of invalidity by anticipation,
reinstated the jury’s verdict of validity and enforceability, reversed the grant of a conditional new trial on
the issue of unenforceability, and remanded for a determination of damages. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Med., Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 884, 2008 WL 5257333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The parties petitioned for
rehearing and rehearing en banc. Id. St. Jude’s petition for rehearing en banc was granted. Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 Fed. Appx. 273, 2009 WL 596010 (C.A. Fed. (Ind.)).
80. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
81. Id. Further, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity and
reinstated the jury verdict of validity. Id. at 1366. The court also reinstated the jury verdict finding the
patent not unenforceable for inequitable conduct and reversed the district court’s grant of a conditional new
trial on the issue. Id. Finally, the case was remanded for a determination of damages. Id. Subsequent to the
remand, the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Cardiac Pacemakers, 130 S. Ct. 1088
(2010).
82. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1363.
86. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
466 (1981) (“‘Component’ is defined as ‘a constituent part,’ ‘element,’ or ‘ingredient.’”)).
87. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363.
limited application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to non-method claims and reversed
the earlier ruling.  Consequently, the court held that St. Jude’s ICDs, which80
executed the patented method outside the United States did not infringe
Cardiac Pacemakers’ method patent.81
B. The Federal Circuit’s En Banc Majority
The court’s analysis considered the language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), case
law, Webster’s Dictionary, the context of the statute in the Patent Act, and the
legislative history of the statute. The en banc majority first distinguished
components of method patents from components of non-method patents for
infringement liability purposes.  This critical distinction ultimately82
“doom[ed] Cardiac’s argument” that the ICD was a component of the patented
invention.  The components of a method patent are the steps in the method;83
the components of non-method patents are “tangible items.”  Therefore,84
relying on case law  and Webster’s Dictionary,  the en banc majority85 86
concluded that the intangible steps of method patents—not the physical
components used to perform the method—are the “components” of the
patented invention within the “definitional requirement” of Section 271(f).87
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88. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629 (2008).
89. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362–63.
90. Id. at 1363.
91. Id. at 1363–64; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (Contributory liability attaches to “[w]hoever offers
to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.”).
92. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363–64.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1364.
95. Id. (stating “[s]upplying an intangible step is thus a physical impossibility . . . .”).
96. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is difficult
to conceive how one might supply or cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps in the
patented method in the sense contemplated by . . . .” Section 271(f).).
97. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2297 (1981) (“The ordinary meaning of ‘supply’ is to ‘provide
that which is required,’ or ‘to furnish with . . . supplies, provisions, or equipment.’”)).
The en banc majority distinguished the Supreme Court’s statement in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. that “[a]pparatus and method
claims may approach each other so nearly that it will be difficult to distinguish
the process from the function of the apparatus.”  The court reasoned that this88
statement was in the context of patent exhaustion where the sale or license of
a product reasonably compensates the patent owner whether or not the patent
claimed a product or a method.  While the distinction may be blurred when89
determining patent exhaustion, the en banc majority emphasized the clarity of
the distinction in establishing patent infringement.90
The en banc majority found additional support for its characterization of
method patent components in Section 271(c), the contributory infringement
provision of the Patent Act.  The en banc majority relied on the contrast91
between “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition” and “a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process” in Section 271(c) to decipher the legislature’s belief that components
are distinguishable from “a material or apparatus” that practices a patented
method.  From this inference, the en banc opinion reiterated that an apparatus92
or material used to practice a patented invention, like the ICD in Cardiac
Pacemakers’ patent, is not a component under Section 271(f).93
After characterizing a method patent component as a step in the patented
method, the en banc opinion turned to the term “supply” in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f).  Relying on simple logic,  in addition to case law,  and Webster’s94 95 96
Dictionary,  the en banc majority determined that only physical objects can97
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98. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1364–65.
101. Id. at 1364.
102. Id.
103. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
104. Id.
105. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1367.
107. Id. (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Sylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
be supplied.  Consequently, by nature of the characterization of a method98
patent “component” as a step of the patented method—an intangible
“component”—it cannot be supplied; thus, Section 271(f) “cannot apply to
method . . . patents.”99
The Federal Circuit majority next reviewed the legislative history of 35
U.S.C § 271(f) to find support for limiting the scope of the statute.  The en100
banc opinion noted that the statute was explicitly enacted to close the loophole
in Deepsouth, a case involving an apparatus patent.  Additionally, the101
majority found that “Congress’s focus on patented products” throughout the
legislative history and the minimal reference to protecting method patents
further supported their position.102
Finally, the en banc majority reiterated the “presumption against
extraterritoriality,” which had been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in AT&T II.  The majority concluded that the limited extension of United103
States patent law by Section 271(f) should not be further extended to method
patents without clear congressional intent.104
C. The Lone Dissenter: Judge Newman
Judge Newman dissented from the en banc holding that 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) did not apply to method patents.  Judge Newman reached her105
contrary opinion by focusing on the text and context of Section 271(f), as well
as the legislative history. Judge Newman’s dissent first argued that it was an
“extreme redefinition” to define “patented invention” within Section 271(f)
to exclude method patents.  Relying on precedent from the Supreme Court106
and Federal Circuit, Judge Newman asserted that the first canon of statutory
interpretation is the presumption “that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says.”  Further, when a statute is107
unambiguous—as Judge Newman asserts is the case for Section 271(f)—then
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108. Id. at 1367.
109. Id. (citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
110. Id. at 1367–68.
111. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
112. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (“a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition,
or . . . a patented process”).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006) (“a patented invention”).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006) (“a process patented”).
117. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1370 (citing S. 2504, 93d Cong. (1974)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1373.
121. Id.
122. Id.
“judicial inquiry is complete.”  Based on the plain wording of the statute;108 109
the definition of “patented invention” in Section 101 of the Patent Act;  and110
the Supreme Court’s holding in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. that
“patented invention” in Section 271(e), an adjacent infringement provision
enacted just six weeks prior to the enactment of Section 271(f), should be
“defined to include all inventions,”  Judge Newman found that “patented111
invention” in Section 271(f) unambiguously includes method patents.112
Judge Newman found additional support for her opinion by analyzing the
statute within the context of Title 35 and the legislative history. She
recognized a pattern throughout each provision of Section 271 “recit[ing] its
subject matter with generality or specificity, as appropriate.”  Additionally,113
she noted that the subject matter of Sections 271(c),  (e),  (f), and (g)114 115 116
reflects the legislature’s intent to enact infringement provisions directed to
specific subject matter.117
Turning to the legislative history, Judge Newman observed that an initial
version of the statute limited the subject matter to “a patented machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.”  Because the enacted statute118
broadened the subject matter to “patented invention[s],” Judge Newman
concluded that this “demonstrates the purposeful action to include processes
in § 271(f), instead of the more limited scope of earlier versions of the
legislation.”119
Towards the conclusion of her dissent, Judge Newman addresses public
policy concerns.  She first dismisses extraterritoriality concerns because120
“[l]iability under § 271(f) is based on domestic conduct and intent.”121
Consequently, the statute does not violate territoriality principles.122
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123. Id. at 1374.
124. Id. at 1373 (“[T]he statutory purpose [of Section 271(f)] is to reach the evasion of United States
rights by actions that are taken within the United States by entities subject to United States law. The
practice of foreign countries of United States-origin technology without any contribution of components
from the United States is untouched by § 271(f), whether of process or product. Liability under § 271(f)
is based on domestic conduct and intent.”); see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25.
Additionally, she acknowledges the potentially unfair effect of the statute on
United States businesses, but still asserts that the en banc majority “over-
reacted as well as overreached” in limiting application of the statute to non-
method patents.123
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CARDIAC PACEMAKERS
The implications of the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Cardiac
Pacemakers relate to various dimensions of the patent system including the
international patent community, United States businesses, and owners of
United States method patents. Upon review of the costs and benefits of the
decision, it is recommended that Congress amend Section 271 of the Patent
Act to protect United States method patent owners under a provision similar
to Section 271(f).
A. Costs and Benefits of the Holding on Various Dimensions of the Patent
System
1. Impact on International Extraterritoriality Concerns
Prior to the Cardiac Pacemakers decision, United States courts had
increasingly broadened the application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), thus increasing
international extraterritoriality concerns. Though Section 271(f) still remains
intact for non-method patents after Cardiac Pacemakers, the creation of a
loophole for method patents reduces the scope of the statute. Consequently,
the international patent community’s extraterritoriality concerns are reduced.
Arguably, however, Section 271(f) may not even invoke strong concerns
related to extraterritoriality. Judge Newman’s dissent in Cardiac Pacemakers
argued that Section 271(f) does not violate any of Professor Goldstein’s
principles of territoriality.  Arguably, infringement under Section 271(f)124
does not result from any acts abroad. Rather, infringement requires “some
domestic act as a hook to reach foreign-based economic activity that harms a
patent owner’s interest in deriving full economic advantage from the U.S.
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125. Chisum, supra note 7, at 607.
126. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
127. See Holbrook, supra note 4.
128. See Farrand, supra note 51, at 54.
market for the patented invention.”  In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems125
Corp., the Federal Circuit held that Section 271(f) does not require evidence
of actual assembly abroad.  Rather, the critical elements to find infringement126
liability under Section 271(f) are the supply of components from the United
States with intent to combine the components into the patented invention.
These elements relate to conduct and culpability within the United States.
Therefore, while Cardiac Pacemakers reduces extraterritoriality concerns
related to Section 271(f), the legitimacy of these concerns is unclear.
2. Impact on United States Businesses
Additionally, the Cardiac Pacemakers decision has important
implications for United States businesses. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) arguably
undermines the capacity of U.S. companies to compete in the U.S. market for
the patented invention against other companies located abroad.  Specifically,127
a United States company that ships components of a patented invention abroad
for final assembly may be found liable for infringement under Section 271(f).
Comparatively, a foreign company or an American company with facilities
abroad that manufactures the same components for assembly into the patented
invention cannot be found liable under Section 271(f). Therefore, American
companies are discouraged from producing goods and services in the United
States. Innovators may move Research and Development facilities and
manufacturing facilities overseas in order to avoid increased liability for
infringement.  The movement of additional American companies’ facilities128
overseas could hurt the United States economy and reduce the availability of
jobs for Americans. Arguably, the exclusion of method patents from the scope
of Section 271(f) counterbalances the movement of United States facilities
overseas because domestic companies will not be subject to infringement
liability when exporting the components that are used to practice a patented
method.
3. Impact on United States Patent Owners
The recent Cardiac Pacemakers decision appears to benefit United States
businesses by limiting infringement liability. However, limiting application
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129. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“A statutory interpretation
that results in all process inventions being seriously devalued, is not free of the charge of ‘absurd result.’”).
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to non-method patents will simultaneously hurt United
States method patent owners. The newly created loophole allows for easy
circumvention of liability for method patent infringement, which will often
leave method patent owners without a remedy. Companies like St. Jude
Medical can now avoid infringement liability simply by exporting parts used
to practice a patented method. Consequently, the value of method claims is
reduced.  It is likely that patent prosecutors will cease drafting devalued129
method claims when an alternative apparatus claim protects the invention and
remains enforceable under Section 271(f).
Interestingly, there is a large overlap between those who appear to
benefit—largely the United States industries who have decreased infringement
liability when manufacturing components used to practice a patented
method—and those who will be hurt—United States companies who own
valuable method patents—by the Cardiac Pacemakers decision. Robust
intellectual property rights are characteristic of the United States patent
system. Rigorous enforcement of such rights in the United States is generally
supported by business that own United States method patents, which they
want to protect. Though conceivably many United States businesses may face
increased infringement liability post-Cardiac Pacemakers, many United States
businesses will also be unable to enforce their method patents in the United
States and will be left without a remedy as in Cardiac Pacemakers.
B. Likelihood and Necessity of a Legislative Amendment
After the Federal Circuit’s Cardiac Pacemakers decision, the American
software company that designs software in the United States and then sends
the software code abroad for the mass production of copies, is only liable for
infringement of the United States patent if the patent claimed an apparatus,
such as a computer, that used the software. A United States patent claiming
the software as a method would not be infringed under Section 271(f). This
convoluted result dramatically hurts United States method patent owners.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Deepsouth, Congress
stepped forward with a legislative amendment to close the Deepsouth
loophole. Perhaps the Cardiac Pacemakers decision indicates that another
legislative amendment is necessary. Several factors currently affecting the
application of Section 271(f) were unforeseen at the time the provision was
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130. William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving Target: The Development
of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 167
(2009).
131. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2d Sess. 2006).
132. Rooklidge & Barker, supra note 130, at 168 n.99 (citing Sen. Patrick Leahy, On Introduction
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133. Rooklidge & Barker, supra note 130, at 168.
enacted. For example, “changes in technology and increases in the cross-
border movement of goods” affect the rights of United States patent owners.
Arguably, these changes “teed this issue up for judicial and legislative
reform.”130
A complete repeal of Section 271(f) was proposed in the 2006 Patent
Reform Act.  However, the proposal was withdrawn because AT&T II was131
pending for decision before the Supreme Court and it was considered more
appropriate to leave the statute intact so that the judicial branch could properly
interpret the statute and resolve the issue.  It was suggested, “with its132
decision in Microsoft v. AT&T, the Supreme Court resolved the principle
concern over section 271(f) and eliminated the need for legislative reform.”133
However, Cardiac Pacemakers indicates that the Supreme Court did not
resolve all the issues related to Section 271(f). While it is likely that Cardiac
Pacemakers resolved the ambiguities of Section 271(f), the resolution leaves
United States method patent owners in a defenseless position that necessitates
further action by Congress.
Congress should close the method patent loophole created by Cardiac
Pacemakers by adding another infringement provision to Section 271. For
example, an infringement provision could create liability when United States
manufacturers export tangible components used in the practice of a patented
method knowing and intending the patented method to be practiced abroad.
Ultimately, Congress must weigh the economic and extraterritorial concerns
of an additional infringement provision applicable to method patents with the
breadth of rights necessary for method patent owners.
In consideration of extraterritoriality concerns, Congress should enact a
statute where liability is contingent on conduct and culpability within the
United States. When liability stems from acts entirely within the United
States, concerns related to extraterritoriality are not very relevant. The court
should also consider the economic concerns related to United States
businesses and method patent owners. Arguably, some United States
businesses may be hurt by the increased infringement liability under the
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134. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
135. But see Gruebel, supra note 28, at 526–27 (“Section 271(f), however, fails to provide . . .
positive incentives, and in actuality only serves to stifle U.S. technological innovation for three reasons.
First, 271(f) provides no meaningful prospect of protection against competition, or even ‘the right to exploit
[an] invention’ in a foreign market. . . . Second, where the sale of an invention in a foreign market is
material to the decision to commercialize the invention, 271(f) provides only negative incentives, effectively
stifling technological growth and innovation. . . . Third, the recent and dramatic change in the interpretation
of the scope and function of 271(f) by the Federal Circuit in AT&T, Eolas, and Union Carbide has
introduced varying degrees of uncertainty into the high technology economic market, which is anathema
to the entire patent regime.”).
proposed amendment. However, many businesses will also benefit from the
strengthened enforcement mechanisms for their method patents.
Congress may also consider whether the increased value in method
patents under the proposed amendment is necessary in view of the purposes
of the patent system. The patent right—the right to a limited monopoly over
the invention—is intended to provide an economic incentive for innovators.
The economic rationale for patent monopolies or “exclusive right[s]” is
present in the United States Constitution, which provides: “Congress shall
have power to . . . promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”  Thus, Congress must determine the134
breadth of patent protection necessary to encourage innovation and to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts.” The Patent Act’s
infringement provisions should correspond to the necessary scope of patent
protection. For example, Section 271(f) provides a larger incentive for
innovators by granting a broad monopoly right that extends beyond merely
protecting their invention when the patented invention is made, used, sold, or
offered for sale in the United States.  Whether an additional provision is135
necessary in view of the Cardiac Pacemakers loophole to encourage
innovation related to method patents is debatable and an important issue for
Congress to balance with the concerns of American businesses and
international extraterritoriality concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Section 271(f) of the Patent Act
in Cardiac Pacemakers severely limits the scope of patent protection afforded
to United States method patent owners. The decision creates a new loophole
in American patent law where infringement of method patents is easily
circumvented, thus drastically devaluing method patents. Congress must
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balance the need to incentivize innovators by protecting method patents with
the countervailing extraterritoriality concerns of the international community
and infringement liability concerns of United States businesses. Upon
thoughtful balancing of these concerns, it is recommended that Congress close
the loophole created by Cardiac Pacemakers by enacting legislation that
protects United States method patent owners from the newly created Cardiac
Pacemakers loophole.
